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Abstract
Politicians care about tax revenues in part because they pay for transfers or public
goods which are important to voters, and which are therefore important for the politi-
cian’s reelection. When economic sectors diﬀer in their taxability, i.e. the degree to
which tax revenues can be extracted by the state, politicians will thus have an incentive
to allocate their support for business activity unevenly across sectors. Formalization
of this idea shows that politicians will be more inclined to favor high-taxability sectors
when transfers or public goods are highly valued by voters, but less likely to do so when
a country’s overall tax capacity is high. Further, the allocation of support will depend
on the relative size of the low- and high-taxability sectors, but not on the number of
recipients of government transfers. Drawing upon a survey of firms in twenty-three
postcommunist countries - where overall tax capacity is in many places quite low,
diﬀerences in taxability across sectors is typically high, and government support for
business activity is often lacking - the model’s predictions are shown to hold generally
in countries with well-developed political rights and civil liberties, but only partially in
the rest of the postcommunist world. Politicians in more democratic countries seem to
be motivated by the electoral concerns central to this paper, while their counterparts
in less democratic states appear to be driven by revenue considerations for nonelectoral
reasons.
2
1. Introduction
In many parts of the world, business activity is diﬃcult without active political support. In
such environments, poor protection of property rights, petty corruption, and bureaucratic
ineﬃciency is the norm, and only the active intervention of senior politicians can assure
treatment by lower-level government oﬃcials conducive to business development.
The question of who receives such support, and who does not, has been of particular con-
cern to scholars of postcommunist political economy. Throughout most of postcommunist
Europe and Asia, business development has been hampered by insecure property rights and
the absence of an impartial, honest, and eﬃcient bureaucracy. Corruption (Scheppele 1999;
Treisman 2002; Shelley 2000), protection rackets (Frye and Zhuravskaya 2000; Volkov 2000;
Gustafson 1999), ineﬀective legal institutions (Sachs and Pistor 1997; Lambert-Mogiliansky,
Sonin, and Zhuravskaya 2000; however, see Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman 2001), and the
“time tax” imposed by overregulation (EBRD 1999) have all contributed to the generally dis-
appointing economic performance of postcommunist countries. Indeed, Johnson, McMillan,
and Woodruﬀ (2000) find such obstacles to be the principal constraint to business develop-
ment in five postcommunist countries, outweighing such factors as access to bank finance.
At the same time, such impediments are not constant across firms or countries. Small
firms are disproportionately burdened by overregulation and corruption, while firms in east-
ern Europe generally face fewer obstacles than those in the former Soviet Union (World Bank
2002; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000; Frye and Shleifer 1997), a pair of observations
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that is further developed in the empirical work presented in Section 3 below.1 An emerg-
ing literature traces this variation in part to the character of incentives facing (often local)
politicians (Shleifer 1997), including the nature of fiscal-federalist arrangements (Oi 1992;
Qian and Weingast 1996; Zhuravskaya 2000), the availability of revenues from raw-materials
extraction (Fish 1998), and the extent to which politicians are constitutionally obligated to
face the judgement of voters (Hellman 1998).
This paper and its companions (Gehlbach 2003a, 2003b) extend and complement this
literature by emphasizing that the degree of government support for business development
is determined in part by the taxability of economic activity, i.e. the extent to which the
state can extract revenues from economic agents. (Unlike tax rates, taxability is not a
choice variable of the politician.) Behind this general argument are three premises: that
politicians are interested in tax revenues, that it is easier for the state to extract revenues
from some economic agents than from others, and that political support of business activity
is costly to the politician (bureaucrats must be monitored, rents passed up from lower-level
oﬃcials must be foregone). Put succinctly, the taxability argument says that the following
two statements, often heard in conversations with entrepreneurs in postcommunist countries,
are not unrelated:
1) “Corruption and overregulation are killing my business.”
1Bureaucratic obstacles and political support also vary within countries. See, e.g., Stoner-Weiss (1997)
for evidence from four Russian regions in the early 1990s, and CEFIR & World Bank (2002) for recent survey
evidence from twenty Russian regions.
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2) “Good entrepreneurs know how to avoid paying taxes.”
The idea that politicians are interested in tax revenues is not new, of course: North
(1981), for example, bases his analysis of economic history on the premise that states are
interested in maximizing revenues, while Tilly (1990) argues that the imperative of raising
revenues to fight wars was instrumental in the development of the modern state. Moreover,
many studies of the politics of taxation emphasize that economic sectors diﬀer in their
taxability (see, e.g., Levi 1988 and Lieberman 2001), a consideration which plays a role in
a number of analyses of business-government relations, including the literatures on fiscal
federalism, hybrid ownership forms in China, the “resource curse,” and colonialism.2
Gehlbach (2003a) generalizes these arguments by emphasizing the social-contract failure
that forms the basis for government discrimination of highly taxable firms, and provides
empirical evidence that politicians in postcommunist countries systematically discriminate
against firms which are less taxable. Gehlbach (2003b) expands upon the basic insight
by showing that when governments are interested in maximizing tax revenues and factors
of production are mobile across sectors, diﬀerences in taxability across sectors suggest that
countries will sort themselves into two groups: those where government support and re-
2The literature of fiscal federalism is referenced above. On township-village enterprises and the impact
of local-government retention of revenues, see, e.g., Che and Qian (1998) and Gordon and Li (1997). With
respect to the resource curse, Shafer (1994) argues that countries with large natural-resource sectors or similar
“inflexible leading sectors” will develop “specialized tax authorities to tap the huge, concentrated revenue
streams such sectors produce, and specialized agencies to monitor, regulate, and promote the activities of
these few critical firms” (p. 13). On colonialism, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) suggest that
the choice of institutions by European colonial powers was influenced by the degree of taxability of existing,
pre-colonial economies.
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sources are concentrated in the low-taxability sector, and those where they are concentrated
in the high-taxability sector. If one takes the low-taxability sector to be new, small firms
(a point established in Gehlbach 2003b), then this is a fair characterization of the “great
divide” (Berglof and Bolton 2002) separating eastern Europe from the former Soviet Union.
This paper, in contrast, takes factor allocation as given but develops a more nuanced
view of political behavior. Rather than simply assuming that politicians are interested
in tax revenue, the model presented in Section 2 examines the electoral motive for raising
taxes. Taxes can be used to redistribute resources from one sector of the population to
another (Subsections 2.1-2.3) or to pay for public goods (Subsection 2.4). In either case, a
politician’s probability of reelection depends on his competence in producing tax revenues,
which in this model means his competence in supporting (taxable) economic activity. Thus,
rather than explaining the failure of politicians to support economic activity by their “short
and insecure future ... in politics” (Shleifer 1997, p. 404; see also Olson (1993)), this paper
essentially treats the politician’s discount rate as endogenous, with the allocation of support
across sectors a function of the electoral return from supporting those sectors.
The model follows Holmstrom’s (1982) formalization of the idea that “career concerns”
can motivate managers to exert eﬀort in an attempt to appear more competent.3 Here,
political support plays the role of eﬀort, and elections replace labor markets. Similar
applications of career-concerns models to electoral politics can be found in Persson and
3More generally, career-concerns models belong to a class of “signal-jamming models.” See Fudenberg
and Tirole (1986).
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Tabellini (2000, chs. 4, 9, and 16) and Lohmann (1998), though in those models eﬀort is
unidimensional. Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a, 1999b) consider multidimensional
eﬀort, but in a nonelectoral setting. The model in this paper is also unusual in that it
involves conflicts of interest among voters (principals).
More generally, this paper shares with many other models of electoral competition the
assumption that politicians lack the ability to commit to following any particular policy
after the election. Hence, voters base their voting decision only on the politicians’ perceived
competence in pursuing post-election policies, and not on any campaign promises. But in
this paper, the lack of commitment power extends to the preelection period as well. Behind
the assumption of exogenous taxability of economic activity is the argument that economic
agents and the politician are not able to negotiate an eﬃcient trade of revenues for support
of business activity. As discussed in Gehlbach (2003a), the inability of the state to commit
to any agreement to which it is a party is one of the primary reasons such a Coasian contract
will typically be impossible. The costliness to the state of fully observing individual tax
compliance and collective-action problems within society also play a role.
While voters in this paper fall into sectors which diﬀer in their economic characteristics, it
should be stressed that there is no collective action on the part of voters. Thus, in contrast to
theories of group conflict that stress the role of sectoral characteristics in fostering collective
action (e.g., Frieden 1991, Alt et al 1996), policy in this model is biased for or against
groups based only on the way their group-specific characteristics map into voting behavior
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(see Grossman and Helpman 2001, ch. 3 for a review of other models in this tradition).
Beyond reinforcing the general proposition that diﬀerences in taxability result in unequal
allocation of political support across economic sectors, the model in this paper produces a
number of more subtle theoretical results. First, it is not always the case that it is the high-
taxability sector which receives more support. Which of the two sectors is favored depends on
the degree to which the politics of redistribution is salient relative to other issues for diﬀerent
segments of the voting population, or on the degree to which the public good is valued by
voters. When (some) voters care more about taxes paid than (others do) about the benefits
those taxes provide, politicians will have an incentive to support the low-taxability sector.
Second, when taxes are used as a means of redistribution, the allocation of political support
across sectors is independent of the size of the population being redistributed to. Countries
with more recipients but equivalent tax capacity will merely have less available for any
individual recipient, meaning that recipients will be less likely to base their voting decisions
on a politician’s competence in providing transfers. Third, politicians will be more inclined
to support the low-taxability sector when the government’s overall tax capacity is high: as
substitute methods of gaining votes, it is the relative electoral return from supporting each
sector (influenced in part by overall tax capacity) that determines the politician’s allocation
of support. Thus, for example, if the low-taxability sector is populated by small firms, “big”
governments will be more supportive of small-business activity.
After reviewing empirical evidence from Gehlbach (2003a), which is consistent with the
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model in this paper but also with a more general model of a revenue-maximizing politician,
Section 3 examines two empirical predictions specific to the electoral-competition model
presented in Section 2. First, politicians in countries with larger recipient populations do
not seem to be under greater pressure to support high-taxability sectors, supporting the
model’s (initially counterintuitive) prediction. Second, the degree to which highly taxable
firms are favored depends negatively on the overall tax capacity of the country in which the
firm resides, but only for the subset of postcommunist countries with well-developed political
rights and civil liberties. In contrast, politicians in less democratic countries discriminate
against less taxable firms, but independently of the country’s overall tax capacity, a result
consistent with a model of a revenue-maximizing politician but inconsistent with the electoral
model of this paper. Thus, the data suggest that politicians in more democratic countries are
driven by electoral concerns to favor firms which are relatively easy to tax, while nonelectoral
considerations are behind the propensity of government oﬃcials in less democratic countries
to provide disproportionate support to highly taxable firms.
2. Theory
2.1. Model With Redistributive Transfers
Consider an elected politician who cares about tax revenues and has some degree of control
over the local business environment, and who chooses what level of support to provide to
each of two diﬀerent economic sectors. Most obviously, this is an elected local or regional
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politician from the executive branch of government, though depending on the political-
economic context the model may also describe the behavior of other political actors. The
support of business activity provided by the politician is not the provision of subsidies to one
industry or another, but rather the creation of an environment in which business can flourish.
Thus, in contrast to subsidies, whose cost is borne by taxpayers and whose provision precludes
other uses of government funds, political support is costly to the politician providing it, and
may benefit individuals other than those in the supported sector through any subsequent
increase in tax revenues.
One interpretation of this costly support, which is consistent with the empirical work
presented in Section 3, is that the politician is engaged in a principal-agent relationship with
lower-level bureaucrats, who in turn interact directly with economic agents. In many parts
of the world, entrepreneurs and business managers are obliged by these bureaucrats to pay
bribes, to spend time dealing with excessive regulation, etc.4 However, by various means -
an explicit instruction to “lay oﬀ” certain sectors, foregoing a share of the rents passed up
from subordinates5 - the politician can reduce the level of bureaucratic interference. This is
the “political support” of this model. Critically, this support is costly: monitoring to assure
instructions are followed takes time and energy, foregoing rents has an opportunity cost, etc.
To keep the focus on the politician’s electoral incentives to support one sector or another,
4Guriev (2002) develops a model to show how corruption can lead to more “red tape.”
5Waller, Verdier, and Gardner (2000) provide a model of a corrupt politician sharing rents with a number
of lower-level bureaucrats.
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we do not model the politician-bureaucrat relationship explicitly, but simply assume that at
some cost the politician can increase the profitability of a sector.
An alternative interpretation, albeit one not considered explicitly in the subsequent em-
pirical work, is that a sector needs a legal framework of some sort to thrive.6 Thus, for
example, the expansion of internet commerce in the U.S. was facilitated by the passage of
legislation allowing for the recognition of electronic signatures. In the postcommunist world,
the development of private commerce depended critically on price liberalization and the de-
criminalization of entrepreneurial activity. Given limitations of political capital and of space
on the legislative calendar, opting to support business activity involves an opportunity cost
in that other issues important to the politician may receive less attention.
Critically, the two economic sectors needful of political support diﬀer in their exogenous
taxability, i.e. the degree to which revenues important to the politician can be extracted by
the state. Taxability thus includes both the ability of the state to collect taxes and the
claim of the state on any profits of state-owned enterprises. In communist economies, these
two means of collecting revenues were conflated. As discussed in greater detail below, one of
the greatest challenges of postcommunist states has been finding ways to collect taxes after
the state’s ownership stake was relinquished. This diﬀerence in taxability implies possibly
diﬀerent levels of support for the two sectors. In what follows, we will refer to the sector
that finds it easier to hide revenues as the low-taxability sector, and the other sector as the
6Drawing on the experience of advanced industrial economies, Steven Vogel (1996) has argued that “freer
markets” sometimes demand “more rules.”
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high-taxability sector.
It is worth stressing that taxability is not a tax rate, and is not chosen by the politician:
it is the degree to which revenues can be extracted from economic agents. Again, it is
perhaps best to think of the politician in this model as a regional politician, who thus takes
tax rates chosen by the central government as given, but who has the ability to determine
the nature of the local business environment. Since firms diﬀer in their taxability, economic
output will be taxed at diﬀerential levels even if the tax rate is constant across sectors.
Alternatively, one can think of the politician in the model as choosing tax rates based on
the Laﬀer curve for each sector: the more taxable a sector, the higher its tax rate.
In this paper, taxes collected by the state can be used either as a means of redistribution
from one sector of the population to another, or to fund production of a public good valued
by all members of the population. In this subsection we consider the redistribution motive;
below we modify the model to incorporate public goods. As will be shown, the model
yields qualitatively similar results regardless of the use of tax revenues, despite the fact that
redistributive transfers involve sharper conflicts of interest between voter groups.
Formally, consider three groups of risk-neutral individuals: a group of voter/entrepreneurs
active in the low-taxability sector, a group active in the high-taxability sector, and a group
of recipients who receive redistributive transfers from the government. Normalize the size
of the population to 1, and let the size of the three groups be NL, NH , and NR, respectively,
so that (NL +NH +NR) = 1.
12
In addition to voters, there is an incumbent politician who decides how much support
est to provide to both the low-taxability (s = L) and high-taxability (s = H) sector in
period 1 and, possibly, period 2. At the conclusion of period 1, an election takes place,
determining whether or not the incumbent politician remains in power and makes support
decisions in period 2. If the incumbent politician is defeated, the challenger takes power and
makes support decisions in period 2.. There is no election in the second period. Providing
support is costly for either politician, with convex cost of support c(est). Each period that
a politician is in power he receive exogenous rents R, which can represent either the pursuit
of policies important to the politician but unimportant to voters, or perks of the oﬃce. In
what follows, the term “politician” will refer to the incumbent politician in period 1 unless
otherwise noted.
Each member of an active sector produces profits πist = est+ θs, where θs is a mean-zero
random variable expressing the “competence” of the politician in power in supporting sector
s.7 (For simplicity, we subscript θ only by sector s, but it should be remembered that θs
refers to the competence of the politician in power in that period.) Generally speaking,
this can be thought of as the support a politician provides to a sector if he puts in a normal
day’s work without bearing the extra cost of monitoring bureaucrats, foregoing rents, etc.
Since the skills required to support one sector (e.g., large state-owned enterprises) may be
7The assumption that the economic benefit of political support in this first period does not persist to
the second is unimportant, so long as the degree to which the benefit persists is independent of whether or
not the incumbent is reelected. Also, note that if we want to assure that profits are strictly positive for
all individuals in both periods, we can generalize the profit function as πist = vs + est + θs, where vs is an
exogenous variable arbitrarily large. The analysis is identical.
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diﬀerent from those required to support another (e.g., small private enterprises), θL does not
necessarily equal θH . Specifically, assume competence θs to be independently and identically
distributed across sectors s = {L,H} and across politicians, with density function f(.) and
distribution function F (.) defined over a limited support.
As in other career-concern models of this variety, we will assume that there is no informa-
tion asymmetry between the politician and voters with respect to the politician’s competence,
and that all parties concerned are uncertain a priori about the politician’s competence in
supporting each of the two sectors. This might reflect the politician’s inexperience in deal-
ing with economic challenges which diﬀer across sectors. For simplicity, assume that θs is
completely unknown to both politician and voters prior to the politician’s choosing his level
of support; more generally, we might assume that there is both a known and an unknown
component to θs, so long as the politician knows no more than voters do.
Critically, voters cannot observe either est or θs individually, but prior to voting in period
1 do observe the sum ks1 ≡ (es1 + θs) for each sector. As will be shown, voters can impute
θs from their beliefs about the politician’s behavior, and use that imputed value in deciding
whether or not to vote for reelection. (The relevance of the model relies to some extent
on the assumption that active-sector voters are no more able to observe competence than
are recipient voters.) If reelected, the incumbent politician’s competence persists from the
first period to the second. Thus, voters have an interest in reelecting politicians whom they
perceive to be competent. If defeated, the challenger takes power, with E(θL) = E(θH) = 0.
14
Proportion Ts of the profits of each member of the active population is extracted as taxes,
so that active-sector voters receive after-tax returns of (1− Ts)(est + θs). Obviously, given
notation, TL < TH . Assume that the government budget constraint is binding in each period,
so that all taxes collected are paid out as redistributive transfers to the recipient sector.
Thus, letting gt be total government transfers per recipient in period t, the government
budget constraint is:
NR · gt = NLTL(eLt + θL) +NHTH(eHt + θH) (2.1)
Finally, in addition to their material concerns (which are identical for all individuals in a
given sector), voters have idiosyncratic “ideological” preferences which cause them to support
the incumbent politician to a greater or lesser degree. Let δi refer to voter i’s ideological
preference for the challenger, so that a voter will support the incumbent for reelection if:
E(transfers/post-tax profits | incumbent reelected)
≥ δi + E(transfers/post-tax profits | challenger elected) (2.2)
The politician knows the distribution of δi, but does not observe it for any individual voter.
A common interpretation of this term in electoral-competition models is that δi represents
preferences over policies with which politicians have little freedom of maneuver. Thus, δi
might capture the degree to which voters support a position held by a candidate (or party)
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for long enough that any change in policy would result in a loss of credibility. Alternatively,
δi could represent voters’ preferences over issues of supreme importance to party chieftains
or funders, and thus over which candidates have little autonomy.
Assume δi to be distributed uniformly and independently across sectors over the interval
[− 1
2γs
, 1
2γs
], where the γs’s are suﬃciently large (relative to the support of θL and θH) to insure
that the incumbent’s vote share always falls strictly between 0 and 1. The parameters
γs thus capture the degree to which voters value the material concerns at the center of
this model over other issues: a large γs implies that voters diﬀer little according to their
“ideological” preferences, so that a politician’s competence in supporting business activity
(and thus producing tax revenues) has great relative importance in the voting decision.
While preference heterogeneity is the standard definition of γs in electoral-competition
models of this type, there is an alternative interpretation which may be more familiar to
many political scientists. Assume that δi is distributed uniformly along [−12 ,
1
2
] rather than
along [− 1
2γs
, 1
2γs
], but that voters in diﬀerent groups attach diﬀerent levels of importance to
government support of firms (and thus tax revenues) relative to other issues. Let γs be
a “salience” parameter that captures the degree to which post-tax profits or transfers are
important relative to the issues represented in the preference term δi, so that a voter in
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sector s will support an incumbent for reelection if:
γsE(transfers/post-tax profits | incumbent reelected)
≥ δi + γsE(transfers/post-tax profits | challenger elected) (2.3)
For example, if redistributive transfers represent pension payments critical to the recipient
population, one might expect γR to be large relative to γL and γH , so that non-pension
considerations matter less for recipients on election day than they do for taxpayers. The
analysis is identical. In what follows, γs will sometimes be referred to as the “importance”
or the “salience” of profits or transfers relative to other issues, language consistent with this
alternative interpretation. For simplicity, we will assume that γs is identical for the two
active sectors, so that γL = γH = γ, but that γR is possibly diﬀerent from γ.
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Note that, unlike in many models of electoral competition, there is no uncertainty about
the distribution of ideological preferences. The source of electoral uncertainty in this model
is that the politician does not know the realization of θL and θH when he chooses the level
of support for each sector in period 1. The incumbent wins reelection if one half or more of
voters vote to reelect after observing kL1 and kH1 and imputing θL and θH .
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
8The comparative-statics results below will be qualitatively similar so long as γH and γL are “close
enough.” For example, if γH 6= γL, support for the low-taxability sector will still be increasing in overall
tax capacity (Proposition 6) so long as γR(γL − γH)− (TH − TL)(γR − γH)(γR − γL) < 0.
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2.2. Model With Redistributive Transfers: Equilibrium
We look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies, where our primary focus is the
equilibrium level of support in period 1. We begin by considering what happens in period 2.
Whether the incumbent or the challenger from period 1 is in power, the politician in period
2 solves the following problem:
max
eL2,eH2
R− c(eL2)− c(eH2) (2.4)
Clearly, the solution to this problem is e∗L2 = e
∗
H2 = 0. Without the discipline of an
upcoming election, the politician in period 2 provides no costly political support to either
sector. Period-2 profits (and hence tax revenues and redistribution) are determined entirely
by the competence of the politician in power after the election: πis2 = θs. Thus, voters have
an interest in returning competent incumbents to power. What distinguishes this model from
similar electoral-competition models is that the politician’s competence is multidimensional,
and that voters diﬀer in the weights they put on competence in supporting each of the two
sectors.
Rather than directly observing the incumbent’s competence, however, voters observe only
the incumbent’s overall performance, which is the sum of competence and support in period
1, ks1 ≡ (es1 + θs). Thus, the incumbent has an incentive to engage in costly political
support in an attempt to appear more competent and increase his chances of reelection.
18
Formally, the incumbent politician in period 1 solves:
max
eL1,eH1
R− c(eL2)− c(eH2) + Pr(win | eL1, eH1)R (2.5)
The key to the model is deriving an expression for Pr(win| eL1, eH1). Bygones are bygones,
so that voters vote for the incumbent only if they expect good things from him in the future,
but past performance is a guide to future performance.
Establish notation such that variables with tildas refer to voters’ beliefs. Thus, θ˜L refers
to the value of θL imputed by voters based on observed performance kL1 and their beliefs
about what action has been taken by the incumbent, e˜L1, i.e. θ˜L = θ˜L(kL1, e˜L1). Similarly,
θ˜H = θ˜H(kH1, e˜H1).
To determine Pr(win | eL1, eH1), we must derive the voting rule for voters in all three
groups. Begin by focusing on voters in the low-taxability sector. Voters in this group expect
profits in period 2 of (1−TL)(e∗L2+ θ˜L) if the incumbent is reelected, vs. (1−TL)(e∗L2) should
the challenger win, as the challenger is untested and has E(θL) = E(θH) = 0. Taking into
account ideological considerations, a voter in sector L will vote to reelect the incumbent if:
(1− TL)(e∗L2 + θ˜L) ≥ δi + (1− TL)(e∗L2) (2.6)
Expected post-tax profits from reelecting the incumbent must be suﬃciently greater than
profits from reelecting the challenger to oﬀset any ideological bias in favor of the challenger.
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Recalling that e∗L2 = e
∗
H2 = 0, we have the following condition for a voter in sector L to vote
to reelect the incumbent:
δi ≤ (1− TL)θ˜L (2.7)
The more the incumbent’s perceived competence, the more a voter must be inherently biased
against the incumbent to vote against him. But the more that voters in sector L anticipate
giving up their profits in the form of taxes, the less important is this perceived competence
relative to other (“ideological”) considerations.
Given that δi is uniformly distributed along [− 12γ ,
1
2γ ], we can derive the proportion of
voters in sector L supporting the incumbent as:
1
2
+ γ(1− TL)θ˜L (2.8)
The incumbent will receive a majority of the votes in sector L if his perceived competence
is greater than the expected competence of the challenger, i.e. θ˜L > 0. However, the size
of that majority will depend on the responsiveness of voters in the low-taxability sector to
competence concerns. If any gains from competence are simply taxed away, voters in sector
L will instead base their voting decision on their preferences over other issues, i.e. on δi. In
contrast, the more homogenous is the population of sector L with respect to their preferences
over these other issues, i.e. the higher is γ, the more competence matters in determining the
proportion of voters supporting the incumbent for reelection.
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Similarly, we can derive the condition for a voter in sector H to vote to reelect the
incumbent as:
δi ≤ (1− TH)θ˜H (2.9)
implying that the proportion of voters in sector H supporting the incumbent is:
1
2
+ γ(1− TH)θ˜H (2.10)
In contrast to voters in active economic sectors, who care only about competence in
supporting their own economic activity, recipients of redistributive transfers take into con-
sideration the incumbent’s skill in raising tax revenues overall, which depends on competence
in both sectors. Given the government budget constraint (2.1), recipient voters anticipate
period-2 transfers of 1
NR
[NLTL(e
∗
Lt+ θ˜L) +NHTH(e
∗
Ht+ θ˜H)] should the incumbent win, and
transfers of 1
NR
[NLTL(e
∗
Lt) +NHTH(e
∗
Ht)] should the challenger win. As with other voters,
recipients vary in their inherent bias towards the challenger, and anticipate that neither in-
cumbent nor challenger will engage in costly support in period 2. Thus, the decision rule
for a recipient voter is to vote for the incumbent if:
δi ≤
1
NR
(NLTLθ˜L +NHTH θ˜H) (2.11)
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The higher is the incumbent’s perceived competence in supporting either sector, the more
predisposed towards the challenger a recipient voter must be to vote against the incumbent.
However, the degree to which competence in supporting a sector matters depends on the
contribution of that sector to tax revenues: recipients of government transfers will tend
to discount skill in supporting a sector if that sector’s small size or low taxability means
it contributes little to budget coﬀers. Integrating across all recipient voters, we have the
proportion of the recipient population voting for the incumbent as:
1
2
+
γR
NR
(NLTLθ˜L +NHTH θ˜H) (2.12)
where we recall that the responsiveness of recipient voters to material concerns is in general
diﬀerent from that of voters in active economic sectors, i.e. γR 6= γ.
Multiplying the proportion of voters in all three groups (2.8), (2.10), and (2.12) by the
fraction of voters in each group, we arrive at the total number of voters supporting the
incumbent given the imputed values θ˜L and θ˜H :
1
2
+ [γ + TL(γR − γ)]NLθ˜L + [γ + TH(γR − γ)]NH θ˜H (2.13)
For given perceptions of competence in supporting an economic sector, a politician will
receive more votes, the larger that sector. Size matters for two reasons: there are more
voters in large sectors than in small sectors, and large sectors contribute more to the budget
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for redistributive transfers. In a sense, what is good for Gazprom is good for Russia, or at
least more of Russia than just Gazprom: large companies not only employ many individuals,
but through their tax payments provide for pensions and other redistributive transfers.
The relationship between taxability of a sector and a politician’s competence in sup-
porting it is more subtle. An increase in taxability makes the politician’s vote share more
sensitive to competence in supporting that sector only if γR > γ, i.e. only if recipients are
more homogenous in their preferences over other issues than are individuals active in that
sector. Recall that an increase in taxability makes voters in active sectors less responsive to
performance relative to other issues - any increased profits are simply taxed away - while the
same increase in taxability makes recipients more responsive, since a larger share of profits
is passed along to them in the form of transfers. Recipients have to care more about the
transfers they receive than do taxpayers about the taxes they give up for an increase in
taxability to translate into an increased incentive to support a sector.
We can now derive Pr(win | eL1, eH1) in the incumbent politician’s problem (2.5). For
notational simplicity, define the new variable Zs = [γ + Ts(γR − γ)], so that the number of
voters supporting the incumbent is 1
2
+ZLNLθ˜L+ZHNH θ˜H . Thus, the probability that the
incumbent wins, which is the probability that his vote share is at least 1
2
, is
Pr[
1
2
+ (ZLNLθ˜L + ZHNH θ˜H) ≥
1
2
] = Pr(ZLNLθ˜L + ZHNH θ˜H ≥ 0) (2.14)
The incumbent seeks to increase his probability of winning by providing support to the
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two active sectors in an attempt to raise voters’ estimates of his competence, θ˜L and θ˜H .
In essence, he hopes to make voters believe he is more competent than he actually is by
providing more support than they believe he has provided. Of course, in equilibrium voters’
beliefs will be correct, meaning that the politician cannot fool the voters into thinking him
more competent. But he nonetheless wants to provide support, since to fail to do so would
suggest incompetence: “[H]e is trapped in supplying the equilibrium level that is expected
of him, because, as in a rat race, a lower [level of support] will bias the evaluation process
against him” (Holmstrom 1982, p. 172).
Recall that θ˜L and θ˜H are random variables, dependent on the realization of the random
variables θL and θH (since θ˜s = θ˜s(ks1, e˜s1), where ks1 is a random variable equal to es1+θs).
In equilibrium, any realization of ks1 within the interval [e˜s1 − a, e˜s1 + a] can be observed
with positive probability, as θs has a support of [−a, a]. Since voters’ beliefs are correct in
equilibrium, this implies that for any ks1 ∈ [e˜s1 − a, e˜s1 + a], voters will impute the value of
θ˜s as ks1 − e˜s1 = es1 + θs − e˜s1. To solve for the equilibrium, however, we must make some
assumptions about oﬀ-the-equilbrium-path beliefs:
Assumption 1: For observations oﬀ the equilibrium path, i.e. for ks1 /∈ [e˜s1−a, e˜s1+a],
voters have the following beliefs about the type they are facing:
θ˜s = a if ks1 > e˜s1 + a (2.15)
θ˜s = −a if ks1 < e˜s1 − a
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Assumption 1 says that if voters observe performance “impossibly high,” i.e. higher than
possible given the politician’s equilibrium strategy, then they will assume that competence
takes its highest value. Assumption 1 is thus a monotonicity condition, as it implies that
voters would never assume that performance of ks1 = e˜s1+ a implies competence of a, while
performance of ks1 > e˜s1 + a implies competence of less than a. (Similar statements apply
to realizations of ks1 “impossibly low.”) Without this assumption, implausible equilibria
could be supported in which voters assumed that high performance implied low competence,
thus robbing the politician of the incentive to provide more support than expected.
Before solving for the equilibrium level of support for each of the two sectors in period
1, we introduce some notation:
f¯(c) ≡
Z ∞
−∞
f(cx)f(x)dx (2.16)
It is worth emphasizing that f¯(c) is always greater than zero, since it is simply a sort of
“average density” of a random variable.
Proposition 1. The unique pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium consistent with As-
sumption 1 has support in period 1 defined by:
c0(e∗L1) = f¯(−
ZHNH
ZLNL
)R (2.17)
c0(e∗R1) = f¯(−
ZLNL
ZHNH
)R
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Proof. See appendix.
Interpretation of Proposition 1 is left primarily to the following section, but two results
are immediately apparent: the equilibrium level of support in each sector in period 1 is
greater than zero, i.e. greater than the level of support in period 2, and is increasing in
R. In other words, politicians provide more support during election periods than during
oﬀ-election periods because of their desire to get reelected; the more important is reelection
to them, the more support they provide.
2.3. Model With Redistributive Transfers: Comparative Statics
To develop more interesting comparative-static results, we must put some structure on the
distribution of the random variables θL and θH . In particular, assume:
Assumption 2: ∂f¯(c)∂c =
R
xf 0(cx)f(x)dx > 0 if c < 0
A suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for Assumption 2 to hold is that f(x) is a single-
peaked distribution with its peak at zero, as for x to the left of zero, x < 0 and f 0(cx) ≤ 0,
while to the right of zero the opposite is true. In the present context, Assumption 1 says that
eL1 and eR1 are substitutes: an increase in eL1 decreases the marginal electoral return to eR1,
and vice-versa. One of the few plausible distributions which does not satisfy Assumption 2
is the uniform distribution: if θs is distributed uniformly the marginal electoral return to
support is constant, i.e. independent of the level of support in either sector. A U-shaped
distribution would not satisfy Assumption 1, but it seems empirically unlikely that extreme
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competence would be more common than average competence.
All propositions in this subsection are simple implications of Proposition 1 and Assump-
tion 2, where we recall that ZHNH
ZLNL
= [γ+TH(γR−γ)]NH
[γ+TL(γR−γ)]NL
. For reasons of space, proofs are omitted.
“Support” refers to support in period 1.
Proposition 2. Support for the low-taxability sector is decreasing in γR, while support
for the high-taxability sector is increasing in γR. Support for the low-taxability sector is
increasing in γ, while support for the high-taxability sector is decreasing in γ.
The parameter γR captures the degree to which transfers are important to recipients
(relative to other issues), while γ reflects the extent to which post-tax profits are important
to active-sector voters. If transfers are important (γR is high), then the politician will try to
win votes by increasing tax revenues, which is easiest if he supports the high-taxability sector.
In contrast, if post-tax profits are important (γ is high), then the politician will attempt
to increase his chances of reelection by pleasing active-sector voters, which is easier if he
supports the low-taxability sector (high-taxability voters discount government performance
since higher profits are taxed away).
This result — that the degree to which the high-taxability sector is favored depends on the
value that taxpayers and recipients place on government performance vs. other issues — is not
obvious from simple arguments that the government is more likely to favor sectors that are
easy to tax. As the following proposition shows, if γR < γ, greater taxability actually results
in less government support: active-sector voters are more inclined to reward performance
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than are recipients, but do so less, the more the profits from that performance are taxed
away.
Proposition 3. Support is increasing in own-sector taxability, i.e. ∂e
∗
s1
∂Ts > 0, if γR > γ; is
decreasing if γR < γ; and is constant if γR = γ.
Nonetheless, a reasonable guess is that in many political-economic contexts recipients
care more about transfers than do taxpayers about post-tax profits, i.e. γR > γ. Pensioners
and other recipients of government transfers may be particularly dependent on government
performance for their standard of living, and thus particularly likely to reward or punish
politicians based on their ability to provide those transfers. The enduring image of Dan
Rostenkowski under physical assault by AARP members is a potent reminder of the salience
of redistributive transfers to those who rely on them most.
Proposition 4. Support for the low-taxability sector is increasing in the ratio of the size
of the low- and high-taxability sectors, NL
NH
, while support for the high-taxability sector is
decreasing in this ratio.
As discussed above, there are two reasons a sector is more likely to receive a politician’s
attention if it is large: there are many voters in that sector, and the sector accounts for a large
share of government revenues. The dilemma of firms stuck in the smaller sector is captured in
the following statement by a representative of the Russian information-technology industry:
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Our country’s primary misfortune is its enormous quantity of natural re-
sources, which allow the government to practically ignore all other branches of
the economy, which together are only a meager fraction of the size of the natural-
resource sector.9
Proposition 4, while reasonable, is not too surprising. The following proposition is
initially more counterintuitive:
Proposition 5. The level of support for each sector is independent of the size of the recipient
population, NR.
At first blush, this seems implausible: more recipients should drive greater demand for
tax revenues, which should encourage the government to support the high-taxability sector.
But Proposition 5 refers to a shift in NR for a given TL and TH . Holding taxability in
each sector constant, an increase in the number of recipients simply results in less for any
individual recipient. While more individuals base their vote on the politician’s competence
in providing transfers, each such voter attaches less weight to competence and more to other
issues, since competence means less when the number of recipients is large.
In this model, it is the government’s “power to tax” (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) —
TL and TH — rather than the size of the recipient population that drives the politics of
redistribution. Countries where little tax revenue can be extracted from economic agents
9Karachinskii (2001, p. 47). Author’s translation from the Russian.
29
should find their politics dominated by other considerations. One might expect governments
in those countries to thus be less likely to favor economic activity simply because it is highly
taxable. In fact, the following proposition shows that the opposite result holds.
Proposition 6. Define T ≡ TL+TH
2
, ∆ ≡ TH − TL.10 So long as γR 6= γ, support for
the low-taxability sector is increasing in T , while support for the high-taxability sector is
decreasing in T . If γR = γ, support for each sector is independent of T .
Holding constant the diﬀerence in taxability between the two sectors, an increase in the
overall tax capacity of the government results in a reallocation of government support away
from the high-taxability sector towards the low-taxability sector. To see why this is the case,
recall from Proposition 3 that γR > γ implies that the politician will more be inclined to
support a sector if it is more taxable. That result holds for both sectors, but it matters more
(in elasticity terms) for the low-taxability sector since [γ + TL(γR − γ)] < [γ + TH(γR − γ)].
In contrast, if γR < γ, a politician will be less inclined to support a sector if it is more
taxable. Again, that result holds for both sectors, but with γR < γ it matters more for
the high-taxability sector, since now it is true that [γ + TL(γR − γ)] > [γ + TH(γR − γ)].
More concisely, an increase in overall tax capacity aﬀects the low-taxability sector more when
taxability translates into increased political support, and aﬀects the high-taxability sector
more when taxability translates into decreased political support. Only when γR = γ, i.e.
10Note that it does not matter where we “anchor” overall tax capacity, i.e. we can choose any T between
TL and TH , since this comparative-static result is with respect to a common change in the level of TL and
TH , holding the diﬀerence between TL and TH constant.
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when by Proposition 3 taxability does not matter at all, does overall tax capacity have no
eﬀect. As we will see in Section 3, it is in fact the case that diﬀerences in taxability matter
less in postcommunist countries the more the government extracts in tax revenues, though
only for those countries with well-developed political rights and civil liberties.
Proposition 7. Support for the low-taxability sector is decreasing in∆ if γR > γ, increasing
if γR < γ, and constant if γR = γ. Conversely, support for the high-taxability sector is
increasing in ∆ if γR > γ, decreasing if γR < γ, and constant if γR = γ
Proposition 7 is closely related to Proposition 3: holding the overall level of taxability
constant, an increase in the “taxability gap” results in more support for the high-taxability
sector (and less for the low-taxability sector) only if γR > γ. Politicians are more inclined to
support highly taxable activity when they are rewarded for producing government transfers.
They are more likely to support less-taxable activity when they are rewarded for producing
post-tax profits.
2.4. Model With Public Good
In addition to redistributive transfers, taxes can be used to pay for public goods. In this
subsection we modify the model above so that there is no recipient sector, with taxes paying
for a public good consumed by all members of the active population. As will be seen, the same
qualitative results hold in this alternative formulation, despite the fact that redistributive
transfers and public goods diﬀer in the nature of the conflicts of interest they generate.
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Since there are no recipients of redistributive transfers, (NL+NH) = 1. Denote per-capita
consumption of the public good as gt. The government budget constraint then implies:
gt = (NL +NH)gt = NLTL(eLt + θL) +NHTH(eHt + θH) (2.18)
Assume that all individuals receive utility from consumption of the public good of αgt.
Then an individual in sector L will vote for the incumbent if:
(1− TL)(e∗L2 + θ˜L) + α[NLTL(e∗Lt + θ˜L) +NHTH(e∗Ht + θ˜H)]
≥ δi + (1− TL)(e∗L2) + α[NLTL(e∗Lt) +NHTH(e∗Ht)] (2.19)
i.e., if:
δi ≤ (1− TL)θ˜L + α(NLTLθ˜L +NHTH θ˜H) (2.20)
This implies that the proportion of voters in sector L supporting the incumbent is:
1
2
+ γ[(1− TL)θ˜L + α(NLTLθ˜L +NHTH θ˜H)] (2.21)
A similar expression can be found for the proportion of voters in sector H supporting the
incumbent. Summing across all voters, the total vote for the incumbent is:
1
2
+ [1 + TL(α− 1)]γNLθ˜L + [1 + TH(α− 1)]γNH θ˜H (2.22)
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Defining zs = [1 + Ts(α− 1)], the probability the incumbent wins is then:
Pr[
1
2
+ γ(zLNLθ˜L + zHNH θ˜H) ≥
1
2
] = Pr(zLNLθ˜L + zHNH θ˜H ≥ 0) (2.23)
which is exactly analogous to the second term in (2.14). Thus, the equilibrium in the public-
goods model is isomorphic to that in the redistributive-transfers model, and comparative-
statics results are similar, where the terms in zs replace those in Zs. These similarities can
be captured in the following two propositions:
Proposition 8. (Proposition 2 analogue.) In the public-goods model, support for the low-
taxability sector is decreasing, and support for the high-taxability sector is increasing, in the
degree to which individuals value the public good, α.
Proposition 9. In the public goods model, Propositions 3, 4, 6, and 7 hold, where the
condition γR R γ is replaced by the condition α R 1.
Proposition 5 is obviously irrelevant in the public-goods model, as there is no recipient
population. In this model, every voter is both taxpayer and consumer of public goods,
implying that conflicts of interest between groups are muted, but that each voter must
weigh the desire for public goods against their cost. As Propositions 8 and 9 show, the
qualitative result is the same. The more individuals value the public good, the greater
the incentive of the government to obtain tax revenues to provide that good, which it can
best do by supporting the high-taxability sector. If the public good is provided such that
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marginal social benefit is greater than marginal social cost (ignoring the cost of government
support), i.e. α > 1, then an increase in taxability encourages greater government support.
As before, an increase in the overall tax capacity of the government, i.e. an increase in
T ≡ TL+TH
2
holding ∆ ≡ TH − TL constant, encourages the government to provide more
support to the low-taxability sector.
3. Empirical Evidence - Government Support of Business in Post-
communist States
Taxability of economic activity is a major issue for postcommunist states. Under commu-
nism, tax revenues were collected primarily from state enterprises through profit, turnover,
and payroll taxes (see, e.g., Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2000). This concentration of
taxes in a relatively small number of state enterprises, plus the fact that funds were chan-
neled primarily through the state banking system, meant that tax compliance in socialist
states was quite high by world standards (Kodrzycki and Zolt 1994, Tanzi and Tsibouris
2000). Liberalization of economic activity and privatization meant that states had to re-
form tax policy, replacing turnover taxes with a VAT and reforming existing profit, payroll,
and personal-income taxes (Hemming, Cheasty, and Lahiri 1995). No less importantly,
states were obligated to fundamentally restructure their systems of tax administration, a
task hindered by state collapse and civil strife in much of the postcommunist world (Ebrill
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and Havrylyshyn 1999).11 Finally, the degree to which new tax systems could be eﬀective
was dependent on progress in modernizing corporate accounting systems, to this day an
incomplete process in many postcommunist countries (e.g., Gorsky 2001). In the absence
of complete tax reform, an entire economy has been built around tax evasion in much of the
postcommunist world, with by-now well-established procedures for evading taxes at little
cost (Yakovlev 2000).
Table 1 shows that the challenge of collecting tax revenues has been greater in some states
than others.12 Overall, the high-reform states of eastern Europe and the Baltics have done
a better job of reforming their tax systems and maintaining tax capacity, as well as pursuing
economic and political reforms more generally. Among the former Soviet republics, Belarus
is the exception that proves the rule: having engaged in almost no economic or political
reform, it has been able to continue extracting taxes from the economy in a way that other
postsoviet states have not.13
TABLE 1
This section examines the impact of taxability on government support for firms in post-
communist countries, concentrating on three key implications of the model presented in the
previous section: 1) when individuals in the recipient sector value transfers more than tax-
payers value post-tax profits, or when public goods are valued more than the profits used
11Russia’s federal system has also created perverse incentives to undercollect taxes. See Treisman (1999).
12Eﬀective tax rates have been studied in a more systematic way by Schaﬀer and Turley (2000), who
compare yields for various taxes across postcommunist countries, and Ivanenko (2001), who focuses on
Russia.
13On this, see World Bank (2002, pp. 46-48).
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to pay for them, then politicians will have an incentive to disproportionately support highly
taxable business activity (Propositions 3 and 9); 2) the allocation of political support across
sectors is independent of the size of the population receiving redistributive transfers (Propo-
sition 5); 3) the degree to which highly taxable economic activity is favored is decreasing in
the overall level of taxability in the country (Propositions 6 and 9).
We test these propositions using data from the 1999 World Bank/EBRD Business En-
vironment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). Through the BEEPS project, a
total of 4104 firms in twenty-six countries were surveyed on various aspects of government-
business relations.14 The empirical work in this paper uses data from twenty-three of those
twenty-six countries. Firms in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the semi-autonomous Serb Repub-
lic in Bosnia were not included since the long war in those two entities makes comparisons
with other postcommunist countries diﬃcult, while Turkey was dropped because it is not
a postcommunist country. In all, the dataset comprises 3762 firms in the countries listed
and characterized in Table 1. Gehlbach (2003a) provides summary statistics for various
characteristics of these firms.
Firms surveyed through the BEEPS project were queried on a number of features of
business-state relations, including the degree of revenue reporting to tax authorities. On
average, managers replied that a “typical firm in [their] area of activity” reports 80 percent
of its revenues to tax authorities, with fully two-thirds of firms indicating some degree of
14For details about the survey and its implementation, see Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman
(2000).
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tax evasion. In the empirical work below, we use revenue reporting as a proxy for the
taxability of the firm. Gehlbach (2003a) defends this assumption at some length, showing
that the covariation of this measure with sector and country and residence accords with
publicly available information on tax compliance by sector and country. Further, we consider
the impact of state ownership on government support of business activity, as state-owned
enterprises are “taxable” not only through taxation but also by virtue of the fact that the
state may extract profits as dividends or by compelling state firms to provide goods and
services that might otherwise be paid for out of state funds.
Further, firm managers were asked to report on various aspects of government “support”
(or lack thereof) for their business activity. In the regressions reported in this paper, six
separate variables are used as indicators of government support for business activity. All
variables are scaled such that a higher response indicates more support. Two of the six
variables measure bribe payment: the percent of revenues not paid as bribes to public
oﬃcials, and a similar measure where the proportion of bribes paid to tax or customs oﬃ-
cials has been subtracted out, since our key independent variable is revenue reporting and
firms might pay bribes to avoid tax payments. Other variables capture other elements of
government-business relations: the percent of management time not spent with government
oﬃcials, the extent to which firms have the opportunity to appeal administrative violations
to higher authorities, the level of contract and property-rights enforcement, and a subjective
measure of the degree to which local governments are helpful.
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Table 2, which is reprinted from Gehlbach (2003a), examines the first of three key im-
plications of the model presented in Section 2. When individuals in the recipient sector
attach greater political salience to government transfers than do individuals in active sectors
to post-tax profits (γR > γ), or when a public good is provided such that its marginal social
benefit is greater than its marginal social cost (α > 1), politicians will have an incentive
to disproportionately support high-taxability sectors. A reasonable guess is that these two
conditions are met, and Table 2 shows that firms reporting more revenues are indeed system-
atically favored over those reporting less. Controlling for a variety of firm characteristics
in OLS and ordered-probit regressions, firms reporting more revenues pay less in bribes,
spend less time with government oﬃcials, have more opportunity to appeal administrative
violations, are more likely to have their contracts and property rights enforced, and are more
likely to say that local governments are helpful.15 This eﬀect is very precisely estimated for
all six measures of government support, and marginal eﬀects are substantial.16
TABLE 2
Further, for four of the six measures of government support, state ownership is signif-
icantly associated with better treatment by government oﬃcials, even after controlling for
the proportion of revenues reported. The likely explanation is that state firms are more
15Gehlbach (2003a) addresses potential concerns about direction of causality and omitted-variable bias in
these regressions.
16Marginal eﬀects are calculated as the derivative of the probability of a given response with respect to
a variable for proportion of revenues reported, and the discrete change in probability for a change in value
from 0 to 1 for state ownership, in each case evaluated as the average eﬀect across individuals in the sample
(rather than the eﬀect at the mean value of the right-hand-side variables).
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“taxable” in the sense that profits can be extracted as dividends or other non-tax payouts.
The one exception to this general pattern - state firms report spending more, not less, time
with government oﬃcials - makes sense: managers must spend time with the firm’s owners,
whoever they are.
While consistent with the model discussed above, the prediction that the government
will discriminate against less-taxable firms can also be derived from a simpler model of a
revenue-maximizing politician. More specific to the model in this paper are the arguments
that the degree to which high-taxability firms are favored is independent of the size of the
recipient population and is decreasing in the overall level of taxability in a country. Tables
3 and 4 report the results of regressions where these propositions are tested, interacting
the proportion of revenues reported by the firm to tax authorities with the proportion of
the population over age 65 and the proportion of GDP collected as taxes by all levels of
government of the country in which the firm resides, respectively.17 (Revenue reporting is
also interacted with the 1999 EBRD Average Transition Indicator for that country to control
for the possibility that revenue hiding matters less in high-tax countries simply because those
countries are more likely to have implemented economic reforms.) For reasons that will be
clear shortly, Table 3 reports results for the subsample of firms in countries rated as “free”
according to their political rights and civil liberties by the nongovernmental organization
17Country dummies, which are included in the regressions reported in Table 2, are dropped from all
subsequent regressions since each country represented in the dataset has a unique proportion of GDP collected
as taxes.
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Freedom House, while Table 4 presents results for firms in countries rated as “partially free”
or “not free.”
TABLE 3
TABLE 4
For almost every measure of government support in both subsamples of firms, the inter-
action of revenue hiding with the proportion of the population over age 65 is not significantly
diﬀerent from zero. Thus, given the data available, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the allocation of support across sectors is independent of the size of the recipient popula-
tion, as predicted by Proposition 5. Only for one of the measures of bribe payment for the
subsample of firms in “free” countries can we reject the hypothesis of no eﬀect.
Further, Tables 3 and 4 show that the proposition that high-taxability firms will be
less likely to be favored in high-tax countries fares quite well for the subsample of firms in
countries rated as “free,” but not for firms located in countries rated as “partially free” or
“not free.” For all six measures of government support, the degree to which revenue reporting
is a predictor of government support is decreasing in the proportion of GDP collected as
tax revenues by all levels of government, and for four of those six measures the estimated
coeﬃcient on the interaction term is statistically significant from zero at the five percent
level.18 In contrast, there is no support for the proposition that country tax capacity
18The model in Section 2 suggests two possible sources of omitted-variable bias in these regressions. First,
it is possible that public goods or redistributive transfers are valued less in high-tax countries, i.e. that α or
γR are lower in countries collecting more tax revenues. Obviously, these variables are diﬃcult to observe
directly, but there seems little reason a priori to suspect that they vary systematically across countries. If
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influences the degree to which revenue reporting matters in “partially free” and “not free”
countries. For five of the six regressions reported in Table 4, the coeﬃcient on the interaction
term is not significantly diﬀerent from zero, and for the sixth the sign on the coeﬃcient is
inconsistent with the theory being tested.
Nonetheless, when the interaction term is dropped and government support is simply
regressed on revenue reporting and covariates as in Table 2, one obtains the same result for
the subsample of firms in “partially free” or “not free” countries as for the whole sample:
the more a firm reports hiding revenues from tax authorities, the less support it receives
from government oﬃcials. In other words, for those countries with poorly developed po-
litical rights and civil liberties, the empirical results of this section are inconsistent with
the electoral-competition model presented in Section 2, but are consistent with a simpler
model of a revenue-maximizing politician who discriminates between sectors based on their
taxability. In a sense, this is not surprising: the electoral-competition model of this paper
anything, it is plausible that in the postcommunist world public goods and transfers are provided with less
waste (and thus more valued) in countries with more capacity to collect tax revenues, since those countries
will have generally eﬀective state institutions.
Second, it is conceivable that the ratio of high-taxability to low-taxability firms, NHNL , is smaller in countries
with high tax capacity; according to Proposition 4, this would encourage more support for low-taxability
firms in those countries. In principle, we could control for this eﬀect by interacting revenue reporting with
the ratio of employment in firms more likely to report revenues to that in firms less likely to do so, e.g.
the ratio of employment in large vs. small enterprises. In practice, such data are not collected in every
country, and (especially with respect to small-enterprise employment) where collected do not always use
the same definitions. World Bank (2002, p. 41) reports share of employment in small enterprises for nine
postcommunist countries, five of which are rated “free” by Freedom House. For the nine countries reported,
variation within “freedom” group is in fact very small, while variation across groups is large. Moreover,
the correlation between small-enterprise employment and tax capacity within the “free” group is negative,
not positive as would need to be the case for omission of the variable NHNL to bias results in the observed
direction.
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assumes that democratic politics function in more-or-less “normal” fashion. To the extent
that this assumption fails to hold (as it likely does in countries with incomplete political
rights and civil liberties), one should not expect the model’s predictions to necessarily ac-
cord with empirical reality. Politicians in less democratic countries may be motivated by
revenue concerns for nonelectoral reasons, while the desire to be reelected dominates the
calculus of support for politicians in more democratic states.
4. Conclusion
This paper has stressed the electoral incentive of politicians to support business activity
in an environment in which economic sectors diﬀer according to their taxability. In so
doing, the paper expands upon a basic intuition: when politicians care about taxes, when
supporting business activity is costly to the politician, and when sectors diﬀer according
to their taxability, then politicians will have an incentive to allocate support for business
activity unevenly across sectors. Focusing on the electoral incentive to provide support
produces a number of predictions that do not necessarily follow from a model where the
politician is motivated by revenue concerns for other reasons: the allocation of support
depends on the degree to which transfers and public goods are valued by voters, and on
the overall level of taxability across sectors, but not on the size of the population receiving
transfers. Empirical analysis of survey data from postcommunist countries suggests that
the model performs better in more democratic states than less democratic ones.
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What distinguishes electoral incentives from other incentives to allocate support for eco-
nomic activity based on the taxability of that activity? Why should we expect the pattern
of support to look diﬀerent in countries with strong democratic institutions than in countries
with weaker or nonexistent democracies? Perhaps the key point is that when politicians vie
for votes, support of one sector is a substitute for support of another in the following sense:
an increase in the relative electoral return from supporting one sector results in a reallocation
of support towards that sector and away from the other, even if absolute electoral returns
have increased in both sectors. Thus, for example, as Proposition 6 predicts and the data
suggest, greater overall taxability implies less support of highly taxable sectors, and more
support of less taxable sectors. In contrast, when politicians have nonelectoral incentives
to support economic activity, such as the desire to skim oﬀ tax revenues for personal use,
higher taxability in both sectors can lead to greater support for each sector, as the politician
reacts to the possibility of retaining a greater share of the proceeds by increasing his support
for each type of economic activity. This distinction arises from the fact that total elec-
toral returns are often capped at some level (in this paper due to the equilibrium condition
that voters are not fooled by the politician’s attempt to appear more competent), whereas
nonelectoral returns to increasing tax revenues typically will not be.19
19Perhaps the easiest way of seeing this is to consider a crude model in which an incumbent politician
“buys” votes through tax revenues, which are dependent on his support for two sectors which diﬀer in their
taxability. Let TLeL+THeH be the percentage vote in favor of the incumbent, R the returns from winning
reelection, and c(eL)+c(eH) the cost of support. Since the politician gets no additional utility from winning
a supermajority, he will provide either zero support or just enough support to win reelection, i.e. such that
TLeL+THeH = 50. The only question in the latter case is what allocation of support most cheaply provides
the needed vote total. Thus, an equal increase in both TL and TH results in a reallocation of support away
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Beyond any theoretical interest, the diﬀerence in government behavior implied by com-
paring electoral and nonelectoral models has an important policy consequence. If (local)
politicians are motivated primarily by diﬀerences in relative returns, then the best policy
by a (central) government might be to keep tax rates low but encourage tax authorities to
collect taxes equally across diﬀerent sectors. On the other hand, if it is absolute returns
that matter, institutions such as local government ownership that provide high relatively
levels of taxability may be optimal.
In developing the arguments in this paper, a number of simplifying assumptions were
made. Most significantly, factors of production were assumed not to be mobile across
sectors. In fact, as shown in Gehlbach (2002), factor mobility can exaggerate the impact of
diﬀerences in taxability, as the size and taxability of a sector encourage government support,
which in turn encourages factors to migrate to that sector, etc. A natural extension of
the model in this paper would be to consider the impact of factor mobility in the present
electoral context.
Second, the empirical results in Section 3 suggest that the model might be generalized
to allow for diﬀerences in the degree to which elections are important to political survival.
Such a generalization could demonstrate more precisely when one would expect the electoral
incentives in the current model to dominate.
from the low-taxability towards the high-taxability sector. In contrast, a ruler who has access to the treasury
for personal use, and who derives utility equal to TLeL + THeH from the support of taxable activity, will
provide more support for each sector, the higher is overall taxability.
Economists will recognize the resemblance of the electoral problem to the derivation of Hicksian demand,
and of the revenue-maximization problem to the derivation of Marshallian demand.
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Finally, the model might be extended to include nonelectoral incentives to increase tax
revenues, including the desire to use government funds for personal use or aggrandizement.
Such incentives may interact in subtle ways with the electoral pressures present in this
model, as the availability of government funds for personal use decreases the importance
voters attach to competence (much as taxability does for active-sector voters in this paper),
while simultaneously increasing the desire of politicians to be reelected.
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5. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Focus on eL1; the proof for eH1 is analogous. Assumption 1 says that voters will have the
following beliefs about the type they are facing, given observed performance kL1 and beliefs
about the action taken by the politician e˜L1:
θ˜L = −a if kL1 < e˜L1 − a
= kL1 − e˜L1 = eL1 + θL − e˜L1 if kL1 ∈ [e˜L1 − a, e˜L1 + a] (5.1)
= a if kL1 > e˜L1 − a
Anticipating this, the politician can formulate his probability of winning, i.e. Pr(ZLNLθ˜L+
ZHNH θ˜H ≥ 0). Taking beliefs about the politician’s choice of support e˜L1 for the low-
taxability sector and competence θ˜H in the high-taxability sector for the moment as given,
Pr(ZLNLθ˜L + ZHNH θ˜H ≥ 0) can be expressed for eL1 ≤ e˜L1 as:
Z −a+e˜L1−eL1
−a
I(−a ≥ −ZHNH
ZLNL
θ˜H)f(θL)dθL+
Z a
−a+e˜L1−eL1
I(θL+eL1−e˜L1 ≥ −
ZHNH
ZLNL
θ˜H)f(θL)dθL
(5.2)
where I(.) is the indicator function, which takes a value of one if the statement is true,
and zero otherwise. The first term of this expression represents observations of kL1 oﬀ the
equilibrium path, i.e. kL1 < e˜L1−a, the second observations on the equilibrium path. Since
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θ˜L = −a if kL1 < e˜L1−a, it will be true that ZLNLθ˜L+ZHNH θ˜H ≥ 0 for all observations oﬀ
the equilibrium path iﬀ −a ≥ −ZHNH
ZLNL
θ˜H . In contrast, for observations on the equilibrium
path, θ˜L = eL1+θL− e˜L1, implying that the politician will win iﬀ θL+eL1− e˜L1 ≥ −ZHNHZLNL θ˜H .
Thus, we can express (5.2) in terms of realizations of the random variable θ˜H . (Recall
that perceived competence θ˜H is a function of actual competence θH , which is a random
variable, and that θL and θH are distributed independently.) For θ˜H ≥ ZLNLZHNH a, the indicator
function takes on a value of one for all realizations of θL in both the first and second terms
in (5.2), implying that for θ˜H ≥ ZLNLZHNH a the politician wins with probability equal to one.
In contrast, if θ˜H < ZLNLZHNH a, then the indicator function in the first term equals zero, and
the statement in the second term will be true only for θL ≥ e˜L1− eL1− ZHNHZLNL θ˜H . Rewriting
(5.2) in terms of realizations of θ˜H , we have:
Z
θ˜H<
ZLNL
ZHNH
a
[1− FθL(e˜L1 − eL1 −
ZHNH
ZLNL
θ˜H)]f(θ˜H)dθ˜H +
Z
θ˜H≥
ZLNL
ZHNH
a
1 · f(θ˜H)dθ˜H (5.3a)
where for the sake of clarity we denote the cdf of θL as FθL. For realizations of θ˜H suﬃciently
low, the probability of winning is strictly less than one. However, for high realizations of
θ˜H , even very low competence in the low-taxability sector will not keep the politician from
winning.
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Similarly, we can derive Pr(ZLNLθ˜L + ZHNH θ˜H ≥ 0) for eL1 ≥ e˜L1 as:
Z
θ˜H<−
ZLNL
ZHNH
a
0 · f(θ˜H)dθ˜H +
Z
θ˜H≥−
ZLNL
ZHNH
a
[1− FθL(e˜L1 − eL1 −
ZHNH
ZLNL
θ˜H)]f(θ˜H)dθ˜H (5.4)
Taken together, (5.3a) and (5.4) define a continuous, diﬀerentiable function of eL1. Taking
the derivative of this function and applying the equilibrium condition that e˜L1 = eL1, as well
as the equilibrium condition that θ˜H = θH (since θ˜H = eH1 + θH − e˜H1, and in equilibrium
e˜H1 = eH1), we have:
∂ Pr(ZLNLθ˜L + ZHNH θ˜H ≥ 0)
∂eL1
=
Z
θH∈[−
ZLNL
ZHNH
a,
ZLNL
ZHNH
a]
f(−ZHNH
ZLNL
θH)f(θH)dθH
=
Z
f(−ZHNH
ZLNL
θH)f(θH)dθH (5.5)
= f¯(−ZHNH
ZLNL
)
where we recall that θL and θH are identically distributed. The second equality follows
from the fact that θH is defined over a support of [−a, a], so that integrating over θH ∈
[− ZLNL
ZHNH
a, ZLNL
ZHNH
a] does not in any way limit the realizations of θH for which f(−ZHNHZLNL θH) >
0, and the third equality makes use of the definition of f¯ . Multiplying by R and setting
this equal to the derivative of the cost function defines the unique level of support for the
low-taxability sector.¥
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Table 1:  Country Characteristics 
 
 1999 General 
Government Revenue as 
Percent of GDP 
1999 EBRD Average 
Transition Indicator 
1999 Percent of 
Population 
Over 65 
1999 Freedom 
House Rating 
Firms in 
BEEPS Sample 
Eastern Europe and 
Baltics 
  Albania 21.3 2.5 7 Partially Free 163 
  Bulgaria 39.8 2.9 16 Free 130 
  Croatia 42.8 3.0 15 Partially Free 127 
  Czech Republic 38.7 3.4 14 Free 149 
  Estonia 36.4 3.5 14 Free 132 
  Hungary 39.1 3.7 15 Free 147 
  Latvia 40.1 3.1 15 Free 166 
  Lithuania 31.7 3.1 14 Free 112 
  Macedonia 38.0 2.8 10 Partially Free 136 
  Poland 40.2 3.5 12 Free 246 
  Romania 33.3 2.8 14 Free 125 
  Slovakia 39.7 3.3 12 Free 138 
  Slovenia 43.6 3.3 15 Free 125 
  Average EE and Baltics 37.3 3.1 13 
CIS      
  Armenia 20.3 2.7 10 Partially Free 125 
  Azerbaijan 18.9 2.2 7 Partially Free 137 
  Belarus 45.7 1.5 13 Not Free 132 
  Georgia 15.4 2.5 13 Partially Free 129 
  Kazakhstan 17.4 2.7 8 Not Free 147 
  Kyrgyzstan 24.0 2.8 6 Partially Free 132 
  Moldova 27.4 2.8 10 Partially Free 139 
  Russia 35.1 2.5 13 Partially Free 552 
  Ukraine 33.7 2.4 14 Partially Free 247 
  Uzbekistan 30.4 2.1 5 Not Free 126 
  Average CIS 26.8 2.4 10 
 
Notes:  Countries included are those represented in the BEEPS dataset (less Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Serb Republic in Bosnia).  Government revenue figures are 
imputed from expenditure and balance data in EBRD (2001).  EBRD transition indicators are from EBRD (1999).  Percent of population over 65 is from The World Factbook 
2000.  Freedom House ratings are from Freedom House (2002). 
Table 2:  Effect of Revenue Reporting and Ownership on Government Support 
(Significance levels:  10% - *; 5% - **; 1% - ***) 
  
OLS Regressions 
 Percent of Revenues Percent of Revenues Percent of Management Time 
 Not Paid as Bribes Not Paid as Non-Tax Bribes Not Spent with Government Officials 
 Estimated Robust Estimated Robust Estimated Robust 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
Proportion of revenues reported 2.72*** 0.43 1.98*** 0.32 3.15*** 1.01 
State-owned enterprise 0.53** 0.22 0.46*** 0.15 -3.30*** 0.80 
Log employment 0.37*** 0.07 0.28*** 0.05 -0.20 0.17 
Degree of competition -0.26* 0.14 -0.17* 0.10 0.49 0.40 
N 2685 2416 3114 
R2 .128 .108 .101 
 
 
Ordered-Probit Regressions 
 Opportunity to Appeal Contracts and Property Local Government 
 Administrative Violations Rights Enforced Helpful 
 Estimated Robust Estimated Robust Estimated Robust 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
Proportion of revenues reported 0.36*** 0.09 0.25*** 0.08 0.26*** 0.08 
State-owned enterprise 0.06 0.07 0.32*** 0.06 0.27*** 0.06 
Log employment 0.05*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 
Degree of competition -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.06* 0.04 
N 2903 3401 3329 
Maximized log likelihood -4935.3 -5370.8 -4658.5 
    
 
Marginal effects 
Always 
(Pr = .10) 
Mostly  
(Pr = .16) 
Fully Agree 
(Pr = .06) 
Agree in Most Cases 
(Pr = .15) 
Very Helpful 
(Pr = .04) 
Mildly Helpful 
(Pr = .18) 
 - Prop. of revenues reported .06 .05 .03 .04 .02 .05 
 - State ownership .01 .01 .04 .05 .03 .05 
 
 
 
Notes:  Constant and sector, country, and town-size dummies included in all regressions.  For ordered-probit regressions, probability is predicted probability 
averaged across all individuals, and marginal effect is average derivative for proportion of revenues reported and average discrete change for state ownership. 
Table 3:  Interaction of Revenue Reporting with Tax Capacity and Proportion of Population Over 65 (“Free” Countries) 
(Significance levels:  10% - *; 5% - **; 1% - ***) 
  
OLS Regressions 
 Percent of Revenues Percent of Revenues Percent of Management Time 
 Not Paid as Bribes Not Paid as Non-Tax Bribes Not Spent with Government Officials 
 Estimated Robust Estimated Robust Estimated Robust 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
Proportion of revenues reported 39.64*** 14.82 11.75* 1.90 92.87* 48.21 
Revenues reported*popn over 65 -70.40* 37.84 -49.00 34.67 -86.74 162.47 
Revenues reported*tax capacity -65.62*** 25.45 -31.64* 19.11 -76.66 71.45 
Revenues reported*reform -1.00 2.12 -0.66 1.96 -15.04* 7.71 
Proportion of population over 65 73.68** 33.84 54.76* 31.22 101.76 140.42 
Country tax capacity 61.57*** 23.55 28.57 17.68 108.66* 64.51 
Country reform 2.07 1.88 1.56 1.76 11.28* 6.62 
State-owned enterprise 0.35 0.22 0.26 0.20 -1.47 1.05 
Log employment 0.42*** 0.08 0.37*** 0.08 -0.22 0.21 
Degree of competition -0.36*** 0.13 -0.26** 0.12 0.09 0.57 
N 970 872 1165 
R2 .130 .129 .032 
 
Ordered-Probit Regressions 
 Opportunity to Appeal Contracts and Property Local Government 
 Administrative Violations Rights Enforced Helpful 
 Estimated Robust Estimated Robust Estimated Robust 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
Proportion of revenues reported -0.59 4.35 7.36** 3.50 9.85** 4.24 
Revenues reported*popn over 65 9.41 13.54 -4.92 12.53 0.17 13.06 
Revenues reported*tax capacity -2.59 7.01 -8.99* 5.01 -15.44** 6.96 
Revenues reported*reform 0.23 0.78 -0.84 0.70 -1.04 0.70 
Proportion of population over 65 -3.98 11.63 6.61 10.87 -4.43 11.44 
Country tax capacity 4.93 6.22 8.04* 4.31 13.33** 6.20 
Country reform 0.36 0.68 1.51** 0.60 2.15*** 0.62 
State-owned enterprise 0.26** 0.12 0.51*** 0.09 0.47*** 0.11 
Log employment 0.02 0.02 0.05** 0.02 0.11*** 0.02 
Degree of competition 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.06 
N 1022 1299 1257 
Maximized log likelihood -1714.7 -2040.7 -1702.4 
 
Notes:  Private firms omitted category.  Constant and sector and town-size dummies included in all regressions.
Table 4:  Interaction of Revenue Reporting with Tax Capacity and Proportion of Population Over 65 (“Partially Free” and “Not Free” Countries) 
(Significance levels:  10% - *; 5% - **; 1% - ***) 
  
OLS Regressions 
 Percent of Revenues Percent of Revenues Percent of Management Time 
 Not Paid as Bribes Not Paid as Non-Tax Bribes Not Spent with Government Officials 
 Estimated Robust Estimated Robust Estimated Robust 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
Proportion of revenues reported 13.40** 6.32 7.61 4.72 -17.08 13.77 
Revenues reported*popn over 65 -35.59 23.74 -6.13 17.27 -74.48 48.26 
Revenues reported*tax capacity 5.51 7.40 0.62 5.53 56.35*** 14.43 
Revenues reported*reform -2.99 2.78 -1.87 2.02 5.02 6.37 
Proportion of population over 65 34.44* 20.09 12.53 14.80 13.41 39.34 
Country tax capacity 1.02 6.21 -0.95 4.77 -33.89*** 10.88 
Country reform 3.58 2.51 2.39 1.81 0.85 5.51 
State-owned enterprise 0.53 0.34 0.46** 0.22 -4.27*** 1.18 
Log employment 0.35*** 0.11 0.25*** 0.08 -0.25 0.25 
Degree of competition -0.21 0.20 -0.10 0.13 0.51 0.55 
N 1609 1449 1829 
R2 .105 .089 .066 
 
Ordered-Probit Regressions 
 Opportunity to Appeal Contracts and Property Local Government 
 Administrative Violations Rights Enforced Helpful 
 Estimated Robust Estimated Robust Estimated Robust 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
Proportion of revenues reported 1.93 1.20 1.51 1.06 0.73 1.06 
Revenues reported*popn over 65 3.08 3.69 2.28 3.51 1.90 3.54 
Revenues reported*tax capacity -0.80 1.30 1.40 1.24 -0.94 1.25 
Revenues reported*reform -0.69 0.48 -0.80* 0.45 -0.20 0.44 
Proportion of population over 65 -3.52 2.95 -4.79* 2.85 0.16 2.87 
Country tax capacity 0.60 1.02 -1.37 1.00 0.40 1.02 
Country reform 0.09 0.39 0.14 0.37 -0.33 0.37 
State-owned enterprise -0.02 0.09 0.27*** 0.08 0.23*** 0.08 
Log employment 0.05*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 0.12*** 0.02 
Degree of competition -0.06 0.05 -0.07* 0.04 -0.06 0.04 
N 1771 1978 1949 
Maximized log likelihood -3035.8 -3242.0 -2796.6 
 
Notes:  Private firms omitted category.  Constant and sector and town-size dummies included in all regressions. 
